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Abstract. This paper is a reflexion on the computability of natural language se-
mantics. It does not contain a new model or new results in the formal semantics
of natural language: it is rather a computational analysis of the logical models
and algorithms currently used in natural language semantics, defined as the map-
ping of a statement to logical formulas — formulas, because a statement can be
ambiguous. We argue that as long as possible world semantics is left out, one can
compute the semantic representation(s) of a given statement, including aspects of
lexical meaning. We also discuss the algorithmic complexity of this process.
Introduction
In the well-known Turing test for artificial intelligence, a human interrogator needs
to decide, via a question answering session with two terminals, which of his two inter-
locutors is a man and which is a machine (Turing 1950). Although early systems like
Eliza based on matching word patterns may seem clever at first sight, they clearly do
not pass the test. One often forgets that, in addition to reasoning and access to knowl-
edge representation, passing the Turing test presupposes automated natural language
analysis and generation which, despite significant progress in the field, has not yet been
fully achieved. These natural language processing components of the Turing test are of
independent interest and used in computer programs for question answering and trans-
lation (however, since both of these tasks are generally assumed to be AI-complete it is
unlikely that a full solution for these problems would be simpler than a solution for the
Turing test itself).
If we define the semantics of a (sequence of) sentence(s) σ as the mapping to a
representation φ(σ) that can be used by a machine for natural language processing
tasks, two very different ideas of semantics come to mind.
1. One notion of semantics describes what the sentence(s) speaks about. The domi-
nant model for this type of semantics represents meaning using word vectors (only
involving referential/full words nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, . . . and not gram-
matical words) which represent what σ speaks about. This is clearly computable.
One must fix a thesaurus of n words that acts as a vector basis. Usually words not in
the thesaurus or basis are expanded into their definition with words in the thesaurus.
By counting occurrences of words from the thesaurus in the text (substituting words
not in the thesaurus with their definition) and turning this into a n-dimensional vec-
tor reduced to be of euclidian norm 1, we obtain word meanings in the form of
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n-dimensional vectors. This notion of semantics provides a useful measure of se-
mantic similarity between words and texts; typical applications include exploring
Big Data and finding relevant pages on the internet. This kind of semantics models
what a word (or a text) speaks about.
2. The other notion of semantics, the one this paper is about, is of a logical nature. It
models what is asserted, refuted, . . . assumed by the sentences. According to this
view, computational semantics is the mapping of sentence(s) to logical formula(s).
This is usually done compositionally, according to Frege’s principle “the meaning
of a compound expression is a function of the meaning of its components” to which
Montague added “and of its syntactic structure”. This paper focuses on this logical
and compositional notion of semantics and its extension (by us and others) to lexical
semantics; these extensions allow us to conclude from a sentence like “I started a
book” that the speaker started reading (or, depending on the context, writing) a
book.
We should comment that, in our view, semantics is a (computable) function from
sentence(s) to logical formulae, since this viewpoint is not so common in linguistics.
– Cognitive sciences also consider the language faculty as a computational device
and insist on the computations involved in language analysis and production. Ac-
tually there are two different views of this cognitive and computational view: one
view, promoted by authors such as Pinker (1994), claims that there is a specific
cognitive function for language, a “language module” in the mind, while others,
like Langacker (2008), think that our language faculty is just our general cognitive
abilities applied to language.
– In linguistics and above all in philosophy of language many people think that sen-
tences cannot have any meaning without a context, such a context involving both
linguistic and extra-linguistic information. Thus, according to this view, the input
of our algorithm should include context. Our answer is firstly that linguistic context
is partly taken into account since we are able to produce, in addition to formulae,
discourse structures. Regarding the part of context that we cannot take into account,
be it linguistic or not, our answer is that it is not part of semantics, but rather an
aspect of pragmatics. And, as argued by Corblin (2013), if someone is given a few
sentences on a sheet of paper without any further information, he starts imagining
situations, may infer other statements from what he reads, . . . , and such thoughts
are the semantics of the sentence.
– The linguistic tradition initiated by Montague (1974) lacks some coherence regard-
ing computability. On the one hand, Montague gives an algorithm for parsing sen-
tences and for computing their meaning as a logical formula. On the other hand, he
asserts that the meaning of a sentence is the interpretation of the formula in possible
worlds, but these models are clearly uncomputable! Furthermore, according to him,
each intermediate step, including the intensional/modal formulae should be forgot-
ten, and the semantics is defined as the set of possible worlds in which the semantic
formula is true: this cannot even be finitely described, except by these intermediate
formulas; a fortiori it cannot be computed. Our view is different, for at least three
reasons, from the weakest to the strongest:
• Models for higher order logic, as in Montague, are not as simple as is some-
times assumed, and they do not quite match the formulas: completeness fails.
This means that a model and even all models at once contains less information
than the formula itself.
• We do not want to be committed to any particular interpretation. Indeed, there
are alternative relevant interpretations of formulas, as the following non ex-
haustive list shows: dialogical interpretations (that are the sets of proofs and/or
refutations), game theoretic semantics and ludics (related to the former style
of interpretation), set of consequences of the formula, structures inhabited by
their normal proofs as in intuitionistic logic,...
• Interpreting the formula(s) is no longer related to linguistics, although some
interpretations might useful for some applications. Indeed, once you have a a
formula, interpreting it in your favourite way is a purely logical question. De-
ciding whether it is true or not in a model, computing all its proofs or all its
refutations, defining game strategies, computing its consequences or the cor-
responding structure has nothing to do with the particular natural language
statement you started with.
1 Computational semantics a` la Montague
We shall first present the general algorithm that maps sentences to logical formulae,
returning to lexical semantics in Section 2. The first step is to compute a syntactic
analysis that is rich and detailed enough to enable the computation of the semantics
(in the form of logical formulae). The second step is to incorporate the lexical lambda
terms and to reduce the obtained lambda term — this step possibly includes the choice
of some lambda terms from the lexicon that fix the type mismatches.
1.1 Categorial syntax
In order to express the process that maps a sentence to its semantic interpretation(s)
in the form of logical formulae, we shall start with a categorial grammar. This is not
strictly necessary: Montague (1974) used a context free grammar (augmented with a
mechanism for quantifier scope), but if one reads between the lines, at some points he
converts the phrase structure into a categorial derivation, so we shall, following Moot &
Retore´ (2012), directly use a categorial analysis. Although richer variants of categorial
grammars are possible, and used in practice, we give here an example with Lambek
grammars, and briefly comment on variants later.
Categories are freely generated from a set of base categories, for example np (noun
phrase), n (common noun), S (sentence), by two binary operators: \ and /: A\B and
B/A are categories whenever A and B are categories. A category A\B intuitively looks
for a category A to its left in order to form a B. Similarly, a category B/A combines
with an A to its right to form a B. The full natural deduction rules are shown in Figure 1.
A lexicon provides, for each word w of the language, a finite set of categories lex(w).
We say a sequence of words w1, . . . ,wn is of typeC whenever ∀i∃ci ∈ lex(wi) c1, . . . ,cn `
C. Figure 2 shows an example lexicon (top) and a derivation of a sentence (bottom).
Γ ` A ∆ ` A\B
\e
Γ ,∆ ` B
A,Γ ` B
\i
Γ ` A\B
∆ ` B/A Γ ` A
\e
Γ ,∆ ` B
Γ ,A ` B
\i
Γ ` B/A
Fig. 1. Natural deduction proof rules for the Lambek calculus
Word Syntactic Type
kid n
cartoon n
watched (np\S)/np
every (S/(np\S))/n
a ((S/np)\S)/n
every
(S/(np\S))/n
kid
n
/e
(S/(np\S))
watched
(np\S)/np [np]1
/e
(np\S)
\e
S
/i(1)
S/np
a
((S/np)\S)/n
cartoon
n
/e
(S/np)\S
\e
S
Fig. 2. Lexicon and example derivation
1.2 From syntactic derivation to typed linear lambda terms
Categorial derivations, being a proper subset of derivations in multiplicative intu-
itionistic linear logic, correspond to (simply typed) linear lambda terms. This makes the
connection to Montague grammar particularly transparent.
Denoting by e the set of entities (or individuals) and by t the type for propositions
(these can be either true or false, hence the name t) one has the following mapping from
syntactic categories to semantic/logical types.
(Syntactic type)∗ = Semantic type
S∗ = t a sentence is a proposition
np∗ = e a noun phrase is an entity
n∗ = e→ t a noun is a subset of the set of entities (maps entities
to propositions)
(A\B)∗ = (B/A)∗ = A∗→ B∗ extends easily to all syntactic categories
Using this translation of categories into types which forgets the non commutativity,
the Lambek calculus proof of Figure 2 is translated to the linear intuitionistic proof
shown in Figure 3; we have kept the order of the premisses unchanged to highlight the
similarity with the previous proof. Such a proof can be viewed as a simply typed lambda
term with the two base types e and t.
(a(e→t)→((e→t)→t) cartoone→t)(λye(every(e→t)→((e→t)→t) kide→t)(watchede→e→t y))
every
(e→ t)→ (e→ t)→ t
kid
(e→ t)
→e
(e→ t)→ t
watched
e→ e→ t
y
[e]1
→e
e→ t
→e
t
→i(1)
e→ t
a
(e→ t)→ (e→ t)→ t
cartoon
(e→ t)
→e
(e→ t)→ t
→e
t
Fig. 3. The multiplicative linear logic proof corresponding to Figure 2
As observed by Church (1940), the simply typed lambda calculus with two types e
and t is enough to express higher order logic, provided one introduces constants for the
logical connectives and quantifiers, that is a constants “∃” and “∀” of type (e→ t)→ t,
and constants “∧”, “∨” et “⇒” of type t→ (t→ t).
In addition to the syntactic lexicon, there is a semantic lexicon that maps any word
to a simply typed lambda term with atomic types e and t and whose type is the transla-
tion of its syntactic formula. Figure 4 presents such a lexicon for our current example.
For example, the word “every” is assigned formula (S/(np\S))/n. According to the
translation function above, we know the corresponding semantic term must be of type
(e→ t)→ ((e→ t)→ t), as it is in Figure 3. The term we assign in in the seman-
tic lexicon is the following (both the type and the term are standard in a Montagovian
setting).
λPe→t λQe→t (∀(e→t)→t (λxe(⇒t→(t→t) (P x)(Q x))))
Unlike the lambda terms computed for proof, the lexical entries in the semantic lexicon
need not be linear: the lexical entry above is not a linear lambda term since the single
abstraction binds two occurrences of x.
Similarly, the syntactic type of “a”, the formula ((S/np)\S)/n has corresponding
semantic type (e→ t)→ ((e→ t)→ t) (though syntactically different, a subject and
an object generalized quantifier have the same semantic type), and the following lexical
meaning recipe.
λPe→t λQe→t (∃(e→t)→t (λxe(∧t→(t→t)(P x)(Q x))))
Finally, “kid”, “cartoon” and “watched” are assigned the constants kide→t ,
cartoone→t and watchede→(e→t) respectively.
word syntactic type u
semantic type u∗
semantics: λ -term of type u∗
every (S/(np\S))/n (subject)
(e→ t)→ ((e→ t)→ t)
λPe→t λQe→t (∀(e→t)→t (λxe(⇒t→(t→t) (P x)(Q x))))
a ((S/np)\S)/n (object)
(e→ t)→ ((e→ t)→ t)
λPe→t λQe→t (∃(e→t)→t (λxe(∧t→(t→t)(P x)(Q x))))
kid n
e→ t
λxe(kide→t x)
cartoon n
e→ t
λxe(cartoone→t x)
watched (np\S)/np
e→ (e→ t)
λye λxe ((watchede→(e→t) x) y)
Fig. 4. Semantic lexicon for our example grammar
Because the types of these lambda terms are the same as those of the words in
the initial lambda term, we can take the linear lambda term associated with the sen-
tence and substitute, for each word its corresponding lexical meaning, transforming the
derivational semantics, in our case the following3
(a(e→t)→((e→t)→t) cartoone→t)(λye(every(e→t)→((e→t)→t) kide→t)(watchede→e→t y))
into an (unreduced) representation of the meaning of the sentence.
((λPe→t λQe→t(∃(e→t)→t (λxe(∧t→(t→t)(P x)(Q x)))))cartoone→t)
((λye(((λPe→t λQe→t (∀(e→t)→t (λxe(⇒t→(t→t) (P x)(Q x)))))kide→t x)))(watchede→e→ty))
3 There are exactly two (non-equivalent) proofs of this sentence. The second proof using the
same premisses corresponds to the second, more prominent reading of the sentence whose
lambda term is: (every kid)(λxe.(a cartoon)(λye((watched y) x))
The above term reduces to
(∃(e→t)→t λxe(∧t→(t→t)(cartoon x)(∀(e→t)→t (λ ze(⇒t→(t→t) (kid z)((watched x)z))))))
that is4: ∃x.cartoon(x)∧∀z.kid(z)⇒ watched(z,x)
The full algorithm to compute the semantics of a sentence as a logical formula is
shown in Figure 5.
Lambek calculus proof
↓∗
(multiplicative) intuitionistic linear logic proof
≡Curry-Howard
(linear) lambda term
↓lex
Substitute the lexical (simply typed,
but not necessarily linear!) lambda terms.
↓β
Target language:
Higher-Order Logic (HOL, as Montague)
Fig. 5. The standard categorial grammar method for computing meaning
2 Adding sorts, coercions, and uniform operations
Montague (as Frege) only used a single type for entities: e. But it is much better to
have many sorts in order to block the interpretation of some sentences:
(1) * The table barked.
(2) The dog barked.
(3) ?The sergeant barked.
As dictionaries say “barked” can be said from animals, usually dogs. The first one
is correctly rejected: one gets barkdog→t(the table)artifact and dog 6= artifact.
However we need to enable the last example barkdog→t(the sergeant)human and
in this case we use coercions (Bassac et al. 2010, Retore´ 2014): the lexical entry for the
verb “barked” which only applies to the sort of “dogs” provides a coercion c : human→
dog from “human” to “dog”. The revised lexicon provides each word with the lambda
term that we saw earlier (typed using some of the several sorts / base type) and some
optional lambda terms that can be used if needed to solve type mismatches.
Such coercions are needed to understand sentences like:
4 We use the standard convention to translate a term ((py)x) into a predicate p(x,y).
(4) This book is heavy.
(5) This book is interesting.
(6) This book is heavy and interesting.
(7) Washington borders the Potomac.
(8) Washington attacked Iraq.
(9) * Washington borders the Potomac and attacked Iraq.
Lambek calculus proof
↓∗
(multiplicative) intuitionistic linear logic proof
≡Curry-Howard
(linear) lambda term
↓lex
Substitute the lexical ΛTyn terms.
↓coercions
Solve type mismatches by the coercions provided by the lexicon.
↓β
Target language:
Higher-Order Logic (HOL, as Montague)
Fig. 6. Computing meaning in a framework with coercion
The first two sentences will respectively use a coercions from book to physical ob-
ject and a coercion from books to information. Any time an object has several related
meanings, one can consider the conjunction of properties referring to those particular
aspects. For these operations (and others acting uniformly on types) we exploit poly-
morphically typed lambda terms (system F). When the related meanings of a word are
incompatible (this is usually the case) the corresponding coercions are declared to be in-
compatible in the lexicon (one is declared as rigid). This extended process is described
in Figure 6. Some remarks on our use of system F:
– We use it for the syntax of semantics (a.k.a. metalogic, glue logic)
– The formulae of semantics are the usual ones (many sorted as in Tyn)
– We have a single constant for operations that act uniformly on types, like quantifiers
or conjunction over predicates that apply to different facets of a given word.
3 Complexity of the syntax
As we remarked before, when computing the formal semantics of a sentence in
the Montague tradition, we (at least implicitly) construct a categorial grammar proof.
Therefore, we need to study the complexity of parsing/theorem proving in categorial
grammar first. The complexity generally studied in this context is the complexity of de-
ciding about the existence of a proof (a parse) for a logical statement (a natural language
sentence) as a function of the number of words in this sentence5.
Perhaps surprisingly, the simple product-free version of the Lambek calculus we
have used for our examples is already NP-complete (Savateev 2009). However, there is
a notion of order, which measures the level of “nesting” of the implications as defined
below.
order(p) = 0
order(A/B) = order(B\A) = max(order(A),(order(B)+1))
As an example, the order of formula (np\S)/np is 1, whereas the order of for-
mula S/(np\S) is 2. For the Lambek calculus, the maximum order of the formulas in a
grammar is a good indication of its complexity. Grammars used for linguistic purposes
generally have formulas of order 3 or, at most, 4. We know that once we bound the order
of formulas in the lexicon of our grammars to be less than a fixed n, parsing becomes
polynomial for any choice of n (Pentus 2010)6.
The NP-completeness proof of Savateev (2009) uses a reduction from SAT, where
a SAT problem with c clauses and v variables produces a Lambek grammar of order
3+4c, with (2c+1)(3v+1) atomic formulas.
The notion of order therefore provides a neat indicator of the complexity: the NP-
completeness proof requires formulas of order 7 and greater, whereas the formulas used
for linguistic modelling are of order 4 or less.
Even though the Lambek calculus is a nice and simple system, we know that the
Lambek calculus generates only context-free languages (Pentus 1995), and there is
good evidence that at least some constructions in natural language require a slightly
larger class of languages (Shieber 1985). One influential proposal for such a larger class
of languages are the mildly context-sensitive languages (Joshi 1985), characterised as
follows.
– contains the context-free languages,
– limited cross-serial dependencies (i.e includes anbncn but maybe not anbncndnen)
– semilinearity (a language is semilinear iff there exists a regular language to which
it is equivalent up to permutation)
– polynomial fixed recognition7
5 For many algorithms, the complexity is a function of the number of atomic subformulas of the
formulas in the sentence. Empirically estimation shows the number of atomic formulas is a bit
over twice the number of words in a sentence.
6 For the algorithm of Pentus (2010), the order appears as an exponent in the worst-case com-
plexity: for a grammar of order n there is a multiplicative factor of 25(n+1). So though polyno-
mial, this algorithm is not necessarily efficient.
7 The last two items are sometimes stated as the weaker condition “constant growth” instead
of semilinearity and the stronger condition of polynomial parsing instead of polynomial fixed
recognition. Since all other properties are properties of formal languages, we prefer the formal
language theoretic notion of polynomial fixed recognition.
There are various extensions of the Lambek calculus which generate mildly context-
sensitive languages while keeping the syntax-semantics interface essentially the same
as for the Lambek calculus. Currently, little is known about upper bounds of the classes
of formal languages generated by these extensions of the Lambek calculus. Though
Moot (2002) shows that multimodal categorial grammars generate exactly the context-
sensitive languages, Buszkowski (1997) underlines the difficulty of adapting the result
of Pentus (1995) to extensions of the Lambek calculus8.
Besides problems from the point of view of formal language theory, it should be
noted that the goal we set out at the start of this paper was not just to generate the
right string language but rather to generate the right string-meaning pairs. This poses
additional problems. For example, a sentence with n quantified noun phrases has up to
n! readings. Although the standard notion of complexity for categorial grammars is the
complexity deciding whether or not a proof exists, formal semanticists, at least since
Montague (1974), want their formalisms to generate all and only the correct readings
for a sentence: we are not only interested in whether or not a proof exists but, since
different natural deduction proofs correspond to different readings, also in what the
different proofs of a sentence are9.
When we look at the example below
(10) Every representative of a company saw most samples.
it has five possible readings (instead of 3! = 6), since the reading
∀x.representative of(x,y)⇒ most(z,sample(z))⇒∃y.company(y) ∧see(x,z)
has an unbound occurrence of y (the leftmost occurrence). The Lambek calculus anal-
ysis has trouble with all readings where “a company” has wide scope over at least one
of the two other quantifiers. We can, of course, remedy this by adding new, more com-
plex types to the quantifier “a”, but this would increase the order of the formulas and
there is, in principle, no bound on the number of constructions where a medial quanti-
fier has wide scope over a sentence. A simple counting argument shows that Lambek
calculus grammars cannot generate the n! readings required for quantifier scope of an n-
quantifier sentence: the number of readings for a Lambek calculus proof is proportional
to the Catalan numbers and this number is in o(n!)10; in other words, given a Lambek
8 We can side-step the need for a Pentus-like proof by looking only at fragments of order 1, but
these fragments are insufficient even for handling quantifier scope.
9 Of course, when our goal is to generate (subsets of) n! different proofs rather than a single
proof (if one exists), then we are no longer in NP, though it is unknown whether an algorithm
exists which produces a sort of shared representation for all such subsets such that 1) the
algorithm outputs “no” when the sentence is ungrammatical 2) the algorithm has a fairly trivial
algorithm (say of a low-degree polynomial at worst) for recovering all readings from the shared
representation 3) the shared structure is polynomial in the size of the input.
10 We need to be careful here: the number of readings for a sentence with n quantifiers isΘ(n!),
whereas the maximum number of Lambek calculus proofs is O(cc2n0 Cc1c2n), for constants c0,
c1, c2 which depend on the grammar (c0 is the maximum number of formulas for a single
word, c1 is the maximum number of (negative) atomic subformulas for a single formula and c2
represent the minimum number of words needed to add a generalized quantifier to a sentence,
calculus grammar, the number of readings of a sentence with n quantifiers grows much
faster than the number of Lambek calculus proofs for this sentence, hence the grammar
fails to generate many of the required readings.
Since the eighties, many variants and extensions of the Lambek calculus have been
proposed, each with the goal of overcoming the limitations of the Lambek calculus.
Extensions/variations of the Lambek calculus — which include multimodal categorial
grammars (Moortgat 1997), the Displacement calculus (Morrill et al. 2011) and first-
order linear logic (Moot & Piazza 2001) — solve both the problems of formal lan-
guage theory and the problems of the syntax-semantics interface. For example, there
are several ways of implementing quantifiers yielding exactly the five desired readings
for sentence 10 without appealing to extra-grammatical mechanisms. Carpenter (1994)
gives many examples of the advantages of this logical approach to scope, notably its
interaction with other semantic phenomena like negation and coordination.
Though these modern calculi solve the problems with the Lambek calculus, they
do so without excessively increasing the computational complexity of the formalism:
multimodal categorial grammars are PSPACE complete (Moot 2002), whereas most
other extensions are NP-complete, like the Lambek calculus.
Even the most basic categorial grammar account of quantifier scope requires for-
mulas of order 2, while, in contrast to the Lambek calculus, the only known polynomial
fragments of these logics are of order 1. Hence the known polynomial fragments have
very limited appeal for semantics.
Is the NP-completeness of our logics in conflict with the condition of polyno-
mial fixed recognition required of mildly context-sensitive formalisms? Not necessarily,
since our goals are different: we are not only interested in the string language gener-
ated by our formalism but also in the string-meaning mappings. Though authors have
worked on using mildly context-sensitive formalisms for semantics, they generally use
one of the two following strategies for quantifier scope: 1) an external mechanism for
computing quantifier scope (e.g. Cooper storage, (Cooper 1975)), or 2) an underspeci-
fication mechanism for representing quantifier scope (Fox & Lappin 2010).
For case 1 (Cooper 1975), a single syntactic structure is converted into up to n! se-
mantic readings, whereas for case 2, though we represent all possible readings in a sin-
gle structure, even deciding whether the given sentence has a semantic reading at all be-
comes NP-complete (Fox & Lappin 2010), hence we simply shift the NP-completeness
from the syntax to the syntax-semantics interface11. Our current understanding there-
fore indicates that NP-complete is the best we can do when we want to generate the
semantics for a sentence. We do not believe this to be a bad thing, since pragmatic
and processing constraints rule out many of the complex readings and enumerating
all readings of sentences like sentence 10 above (and more complicated examples) is
a difficult task. There is a trade-off between the work done in the syntax and in the
syntax-semantics interface, where the categorial grammar account incorporates more
i.e. c2n is the number of words required to produce an n-quantifier sentence) and O(c
c2n
0 Cc1c2n)
is in o(n!).
11 In addition, Ebert (2005) argues that underspecification languages are not expressive enough
to capture all possible readings of a sentence in a single structure. So underspecification does
not solve the combinatorial problem but, at best, reduces it.
than the traditional mildly context-sensitive formalisms. It is rather easy to set up a cat-
egorial grammar parser in such a way that it produces underspecified representations in
time proportional to n2 (Moot 2007). However, given that such an underspecified rep-
resentation need not have any associated semantics, such a system would not actually
qualify as a parser. We believe, following Carpenter (1994) and Jacobson (2002), that
giving an integrated account of the various aspects of the syntax-semantics interface is
the most promising path.
Our grammatical formalisms are not merely theoretical tools, but also form the ba-
sis of several implementations (Morrill & Valentı´n 2015, Moot 2015), with a rather
extensive coverage of various semantic phenomena and their interactions, including
quantification, gapping, ellipsis, coordination, comparative subdeletion, etc.
4 Complexity of the semantics
The complexity of the syntax discussed in the previous section only considered the
complexity of computing unreduced lambda terms as the meaning of a sentence. Even
in the standard, simply typed Montagovian framework, normalizing lambda terms is
known to be of non-elementary complexity (Schwichtenberg 1982), essentially due to
the possibility of recursive copying. In spite of this forbidding worst-time complex-
ity, normalization does not seem to be a bottleneck in the computation of meaning for
practical applications (Bos et al. 2004, Moot 2010).
Is there a deeper reason for this? We believe that natural language semantics uses a
restricted fragment of the lambda calculus, soft lambda calculus. This calculus restricts
recursive copying and has been shown to characterize the complexity class P exactly
(Lafont 2004, Baillot & Mogbil 2004). Hence, this would explain why even naive im-
plementations of normalization perform well in practice.
The question of whether soft linear logic suffices for our semantic parser may ap-
pear hard to answer, however, it an obvious (although tedious) result. To show that all
the semantic lambda terms can be typed in soft linear logic, we only need to verify
that every lambda in the lexicon is soft. There is a finite number of words, with only a
finite number of lambda terms per word. Furthermore, words from open classes (nouns,
verbs, adjectifs, manner adverbs,... in which speakers may introduce new words... about
200.000 inflected word forms) are the most numerous and all have soft and often even
linear lambda terms. Thus only closed class words (grammatical words such as pro-
nouns, conjunctions, auxiliary verbs,... and some complex adverbs, such as “too”) may
potentially need a non-soft semantic lambda term: there are less than 500 such words,
so it is just a matter of patience to prove they all have soft lambda terms. Of course,
finding deep reasons (cognitive, linguistic) for semantic lambda terms to be soft in any
language would be much more difficult (and much more interesting!).
When adding coercions, as in Section 2, the process becomes a bit more compli-
cated. However, the system of Lafont (2004) includes second-order quantifiers hence re-
duction stays polynomial once coercions have been chosen. Their choice (as the choice
of the syntactic category) increases complexity: when there is a type mismatch gA→XuB
one needs to chose one of the coercions of type B→ A provided by the entries of the
words in the analysed phrase, with the requirement that when a rigid coercion is used,
all other coercions provided by the same word are blocked (hence rigid coercions, as op-
posed to flexible coercions decrease the number of choices for other type mismatches).
Finally, having computed a set of formulas in higher-order logic corresponding to
the meaning of a sentence, though of independent interest for formal semanticists, is
only a step towards using these meaning representations for concrete applications. Typ-
ical applications such as question answering, automatic summarization, etc. require
world knowledge and common sense reasoning but also a method for deciding about
entailment: that is, given a set of sentences, can we conclude that another sentence is
true. This question is of course undecidable, already in the first-order case. However,
some recent research shows that even higher-order logic formulas of the type produced
by our analysis can form the basis of effective reasoning mechanisms (Chatzikyriakidis
& Luo 2014, Mineshima et al. 2015) and we leave it as an interesting open question to
what extent such reasoning can be applied to natural language processing tasks.
5 Conclusion
It is somewhat surprising that, in constrast to the well-developed theory of the al-
gorithmic complexity of parsing, little is known about semantic analysis, even though
computational semantics is an active field, as the recurring conferences with the same
title as well as the number of natural language processing applications show. In this
paper we simply presented remarks on the computability and on the complexity of this
process. The good news is that semantics (at least defined as a set of logical formula)
is computable. This was known, but only implicitly: Montague gave a set of instruction
to compute the formula (and to interpret it in a model), but he never showed that, when
computing such logical formula(s):
– the process he defined stops with a normal lambda terms of type proposition (t),
– eta-long normal lambda terms with constants being either logical connectives or
constants of a first (or higher order) logical language are in bijective correspondence
with formulas of this logical language (this is more or less clear in the work of
Church (1940) on simple type theory).
– the complexity of the whole process has a known complexity class, in particular the
beta-reduction steps which was only discovered years after his death (Schwichten-
berg 1982).
A point that we did not discuss is that we considered worst case complexity viewed
as a function from the number of words in a sentence a logical formula. Both aspects
of our point of view can be challenged: in practice, grammar size is at least as impor-
tance as sentence length and average case complexity may be more appropriate than
worst case complexity. Though the high worst case complexity shows that computing
the semantics of a sentence is not always efficient, we nevertheless believe, confirmed
by actual practice, that statistical models of a syntactic or semantic domain improve
efficiency considerably, by providing extra information (as a useful though faillible “or-
acle”) for many of the difficult choices. Indeed, human communication and understand-
ing are very effective in general, but, from time to time, we misunderstand eachother or
need to ask for clarifications. For computers, the situation is almost identical: most sen-
tences are analysed quickly, while some require more time or even defeat the software.
Even though it is quite difficult to obtain the actual probability distribution on sentence-
meaning pairs, we can simply estimate such statistics empirically by randomly selecting
manually annotated examples from a corpus. The other aspect, the sentence length, is,
as opposed to what is commonly assumed in complexity theory, not a very safisfactory
empirical measure of performance: indeed the average number of words per sentence is
around 10 in spoken language and around 25 in written language. Sentences with more
than 100 words are very rare12. Furthermore, lengthy sentences tend to have a simple
structure, because otherwise they would quickly become incomprehensible (and hard
to produce as well). Experience with parsing shows that in many cases, the grammar
size is at least as important as sentence length for the empirical complexity of parsing
algorithms (Joshi 1997, Sarkar 2000, Go´mez-Rodrı´guez et al. 2006). Grammar size,
though only a constant factor in the complexity, tends to be a big constant for realistic
grammars: grammars with between 10.000 and 20.000 rules are common.
We believe that the complexity of computing the semantics and of reasoning with
the semantic representations are some of the most important reasons that the Turing test
is presently out of reach.
12 To given an indication, the TLGbank contains more than 14.000 French sentences and has a
median of 26 words per sentence, 99% of sentences having less than 80 words, with outliers
at 190 and at 266 (the maximum sentence length in the corpus).
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